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PARTY FAMILY OR NATION STATE? 






The erosion of both the autonomy of individual states and the differences between the 
political Left and Right are often seen as the result of the increasing 
internationalisation of governance. Due to the legally binding nature and supremacy 
of its legislation over national law and policy, the European Union is often seen as 
principal cause of these developments in Europe. However, national officials play a 
major role in the formulation and national governments make important choices in the 
domestic implementation1 of these policies. This article focuses on the latter aspect 
and examines the impact that the partisan complexion of government has on that stage 
of the policy process.  
 
In the area of European integration ‘compliance’ with EU legislation has been linked 
to a wide range of factors, including institutional capabilities, culture, veto points, 
issue salience and the organisation of domestic groups (Duina and Blithe, 1999, 
Haverland, 2000, Börzel and Risse, 2000, Tallberg, 2002, Sverdrup, 2004, Falkner et 
al., 2005a, Linos, 2007, Börzel et al., 2010, Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006, 
Sprungk, 2013, Versluis, 2007).  These are associated with either the enforcement 
(Downs et al., 1996) or the management perspective (Chayes and Chayes, 1993) on 
compliance found in the international relations literature.  Scholars who touch on the 
relevance of party government (and, in effect, follow the call by Mastenbroek and 
Kaeding to go beyond the static notion of ‘goodness of fit’ by examining the 
preferences of key players) focus overwhelmingly2 on the transposition of EU 
directives into the national statute books - or even one aspect thereof, such as 
timeliness (see, e.g. Toshkov, 2007, Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013) - rather than 
the more challenging task of analyzing how these preferences are acted upon in 
subsequent stages3, do not problematise the origin of party preferences and, finally, 
disagree on their impact4.  
 
A change of party in government may alter the domestic pattern of implementation. 
First, domestic political contestation and their distinctive référentiel induce the main 
parties to pursue policies that distinguish them from their competitors even in the era 
of traditional voter de-alignment. Second, the governments of EU member states have 
the right to pursue higher standards than those stipulated by EU legislation in policy 
areas such as socio-economic regulation and the protection of the environment. 
Finally, the ‘parties matter’ thesis (see, e.g. Castles, 1982) has been called into 
question due to globalization and European integration, but more recently 
comparativists argued that parties of the Left and Right that operate in the same 
country vary on European integration and have more in common with other parties of 
the same family in other countries (Marks and Wilson, 2000, Marks et al., 2002).  
 
On the other hand, cross-national differences between parties of the same political 
family can also be expected due to a range of factors such as the political salience of 
membership of the EU, policy legacies, domestic institutions, etc. So, instead of 
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separating the partisan dimension from the specificities of the domestic context, the 
two ought to be examined together.  
 
This analysis necessitates two kinds of comparisons reflecting the logic of both the 
most similar and the most different systems. A within-country analysis facilitates the 
discussion of the ‘parties matter’ thesis since in this way the context is kept constant 
and only the parties in government vary. A cross-country comparison facilitates the 
exploration of the applicability of the ‘parties matter’ thesis in different settings. This 
article examines the implementation (i.e. transposition and carrying out) of a typical 
example of EU socio-economic regulation (namely the original Working Time 
Directive5) by governments of the Left and the Right in Britain and France. Several 
factors motivate these choices and allow broader conclusions to be drawn6.   
 
Rather than being confined to a narrow policy area, this Directive directly relates to a 
broad range of policy considerations since it affects the availability and cost of labour, 
health, safety and other social considerations such as work-life balance and family 
life.  Second, it exemplifies the EU’s style of socio-economic regulation: it involves 
specific common minimum standards that must be met within a specific time frame, 
while individual member states retain a degree of discretion mainly with regards to 
pursuing higher standards. In addition, it directly relates to the socio-economic 
domain - which is the most salient issue dimension in Britain and France (Lijphart, 
1999: table 5.3) - i.e. precisely the broad policy area where the Left and the Right are 
thought to have converged in the past two decades. This is why it cannot be construed 
as a ‘most likely case’7 where few or insignificant differences between governments 
of different ideological orientation can be expected, given the argument regarding 
policy convergence between the Left and the Right (Caul and Gray, 2000).   
 
The selection of Britain and France reflects the logic of the most different systems 
design. Despite their similarities in terms of their association with the Westminster 
model and their level of economic development, they differ in several ways, namely 
the political salience of membership of the EU (thus producing different structures of 
incentives for parties), their policy traditions in this area (legislative interventions in 
the case of France unlike the UK where post-1979 break with the tradition of 
collective laissez-faire in favour of the autonomy of employers and the 
individualisation of the workforce), patterns of interest organization (trade union 
membership, organizational coherence party-union links on the Left), and the extent 
of change that the Directive in question would bring to pre-existing domestic policy. 
These will inform the cross-national comparison.  
 
Using process tracing to analyse this case diachronically, and drawing on a broad 
range of sources including documentary material and 64 interviews with three sets of 
stakeholders8, analysis here focuses on the comparison of the behaviour of 
governments of the Right and Left between 1993 and 2010. These are government 
decisions that relate not only to the legislative domain (such as the scope of the 
legislation that transposes EU directives, the level of protection offered by means of 
rights etc.) but also the broader mobilisation of the tools of government (including 
public agencies in charge of enforcement, instructions to them, efforts to address 
problems during the post-transposition stage etc.) in an effort to cope with the 
exigencies of the directive.  Is the partisan complexion of government reflected in 
these decisions?  That is this article’s central question.  The next section outlines the 
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theoretical framework, the third presents the empirical material, the fourth discusses it 
and the final one concludes. 
 
 
CLEAVAGE THEORY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF ‘THE NATIONAL’ 
 
In the original formulation of the argument by Marks and Hooghe, two dimensions 
were thought to define the structure of political contestation in the EU (Hooghe and 
Marks, 1999).  The vertical dimension relates to the issue of sovereignty: those who 
support deeper integration are distinguished from those who seek to preserve the 
nation state.  The horizontal dimension reflects the conflict between the Left and the 
Right that remains an enduring organising principle of political contestation in 
European states (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).  On redistribution and the regulation of 
capitalism, parties of the Right aim to reduce taxes, government spending, regulation 
and the role of the state in the economy while parties of the Left hold the belief that 
government should remain a significant actor in the economy. More broadly, unlike 
the Right, the Left supports intervention to promote equality and a more substantial 
conception of liberty. Though subsequent work has demonstrated the relevance of a 
non-economic, cultural or ‘new politics’ dimension (Hooghe et al., 2002) 
distinguishing between Green, alternative and libertarian parties on the one hand and 
traditionalist, authoritarian and nationalist parties on the other (GAL/TAN), they have 
also demonstrated that ‘basic structures of party competition in the East and West are 
fundamentally and explicably different’ and in Western Europe (the focus of this 
article) ‘there are strong affinities between Left and Gal and between Right and Tan’ 
(Marks et al., 2006: 155, 157). 
 
Where are parties located in this structure of political contestation and why? From the 
perspective of the IR-inspired liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998), the 
national location of a political party can be expected to determine its preferences. On 
the contrary, drawing on cleavage theory and new institutionalism, Marks and Wilson 
sought to explain the position of national political parties on European (political and 
economic) integration between 1984 and 1996. Lipset and Rokkan – key exponents of 
cleavage theory - construed modern European party systems as the products of 
historical conflicts that took place between the Protestant Reformation and the 
Industrial Revolution that created dichotomies of interests (centre-periphery, church 
against the state, primary against the secondary economy and, finally, the class 
cleavage pitching labour against capital). The interactions between these cleavages 
subsequently shaped political alignments. Enduring and distinct identities, institutions 
and patterns of political conflict have been created that explain the ‘freezing’ as well 
as national variations in party systems.  Second, as institutionalists have claimed, 
organisations handle new issues on the basis of existing schemes and standard 
operating procedures (March and Olsen, 1989). On the basis of these two core claims 
and drawing on empirical evidence from an expert survey, Marks and Wilson 
conclude that parties assimilate the new issue of European integration into pre-
existing ideologies that are shared by party leadership, activists and constituencies 
and mirror enduring commitments on core domestic issues. As a result of their use of 
these historically defined ‘prisms’ – a form of shared référentiel - parties develop 
preferences on European integration that have much more in common with other 
parties in the same political family than they do with other parties in the same country 
(Marks and Wilson, 2000).   




Mainstream parties (Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats and 
Conservatives) are divided into two (not necessarily homogenous) groups, namely 
those who support regulated capitalism and the proponents of neo-liberal capitalism 
(Hooghe and Marks, 1999). Right wing parties support market integration – i.e. ‘they 
support European integration in general terms - but they oppose policies, particularly 
concerning the environment, cohesion, or employment, that regulate capitalism’ 
(Hooghe et al., 2002). Neo-liberal capitalism seeks to insulate markets from the 
political sphere. Support for the single market project under narrowly-defined 
supranational supervision is combined with decision making in fora where national 
governments retain a privileged role unlike the national arena where they are faced 
with historically rooted social groups (such as unions) and directly elected 
parliaments. Competition extends to firms, workers as well as governments. 
 
The ‘partisan hypothesis’ can thus be defined with regard to the implementation of 
EU public policy at the domestic level. Since the issue of European integration is 
assimilated into pre-existing ideologies that are shared by party leadership, activists 
and constituencies and mirror enduring commitments on core domestic issues, these 
historically defined prisms come into play when EU policy takes precise meaning, i.e. 
when it is implemented at the national level. When in power, parties are expected to 
deal with the exigencies of EU policy implementation in a manner that reflects their 
commitment to one of the aforementioned ‘prisms’. In other words, the parties use 
these prisms to make sense of what is at stake, define their position and shape 
outcomes. 
 
However, variations within political families (across borders) can also be expected 
(Marks and Wilson, 2000). Amongst social democrats initial differences relate to 
domestic achievements and the development of the process of integration. Social 
democratic parties that have been successful at the domestic level initially adopted a 
negative stance on European integration (which they originally saw as a threat to their 
domestic achievements) while their counterparts in countries where social democracy 
was weak or hard to sustain had a more positive stance. Subsequent developments at 
the national and the European level have led these two groups to converge to a much 
more positive attitude towards European integration. Conservative parties stand on the 
class cleavage like their social democrat opponents but unlike them, they appeal to 
middle and upper class voters. Variation in their positions on European integration 
reflects the relative strength of two ideological strands that permeate these parties, 
namely neo-liberalism (which entails support for free markets and minimal state 
intervention) and nationalism that rejects the notion that class is relevant to the major 
political issues facing the nation. Neo-liberalism leads them to support European 
integration as a mechanism that can weaken national market regulation, coupled with 
minimal institutions that ensure the credibility of the European market without 
constraining competition between national regimes that seek to attract mobile factors 
of production. Nationalists, on the other hand, whilst sharing with neo-liberals 
opposition to political integration at the European level, disagree with them on the 
notion of weakening national sovereignty even if this is required for the advancement 
of economic integration. 
 
There are additional reasons why variation can be expected from parties of the same 
political family that operate in different states. The political salience of EU 
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membership (Steenbergen and Scott, 2004) might induce them to adjust their action in 
the implementation stage so as to avoid paying the price in electoral terms. Moreover, 
the autonomy of political parties may be affected by the distribution of power 
between domestic groups (trade unions, employers). In that respect, the degree of 
centralization, internal coherence, and representation among these groups might be 
particularly influential (Menz, 2003) as is the party-union link on the Left. Finally, in 
the socio-economic domain the status quo ante might also account for differences 
within political families since change creates winners and losers.  As a result, the 
margin of discretion (and political outcomes) may vary across states, despite a 
common ideological basis shared by parties of the same political family.  
 
 
THE WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE 
 
The Directive explicitly stipulates that individual member states reserve the right to 
apply higher standards, establishes compulsory limits regarding the amount of time a 
worker can be required to work (48 hours per week on average including overtime) 
and the amount of time a night worker can be required to work (an average of eight in 
24 hours of work) coupled with record-keeping requirements regarding the regular 
use of night workers, and creates a right for night workers to receive free health 
assessments before their employment in night shifts and at regular intervals thereafter. 
In addition, it creates rights to eleven consecutive hours of rest per day and (when the 
working day is longer than six hours) a right to an in-work rest break, a weekly rest 
period of 35 consecutive hours and a day off each week and four weeks’ paid leave 
per annum. The Directive also offers the possibility of various derogations and 
exemptions, in part as concessions made in an effort to appease the Conservative 
British government. The most important concession was the ‘opt-out’ clause whereby 
member states have the right to introduce legislation that allows individual workers to 
exceed the 48-hour limit. Other concessions include derogations (without 
compensation) from the provisions on daily and weekly rest periods, breaks, limits to 
work at night, the weekly work limit and the reference period used to calculate 
working hours for various groups, activities and occupations (such as executives, 
family workers and clergymen).  
 
In other words, the directive deals with value-laden issues (the autonomy of the 
market, the individual as a worker-economic unit or a multi-faceted human being, the 
autonomy of intermediary institutions and the role of the state in the management of 
economic affairs) and symbolizes an uneasy compromise between neo-liberals and 
the supporters of regulated capitalism. Chief amongst the issues raised by the 
directive are the scope (i.e. the workers covered) of its transposition into domestic 
legislation, the day-to-day action by national implementing authorities, the issue of 
flexibility and, finally, the relationship to unions and employers. 
 
UK: From the neo-liberal Tories to New Labour 
In Britain these provisions were seen as a precursor of significant change. During the 
last quarter of the 20th century Britain had moved away from the tradition of 
‘collective laissez-faire’ (i.e. the prevalence of collective agreements and the 
concomitant confinement of legislation to an auxiliary role) (Davies and Freedland, 
1993) and a basic 48-hour week that had been established through collective 
agreement in the trend-setting engineering industry in the 1920s and had subsequently 
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been reduced to 39 hours. Premium rates of pay for overtime and unsocial hours of 
work - rather than restrictions on working hours as such - was a central concern for 
unions and their members throughout the 20th century, to a large extent because low 
basic pay rates meant that paid overtime had become institutionalised both for 
employers and entire households that relied extensively on it.  As a result, the actual 
hours worked regularly exceeded the basic working week (Financial Times, 13 
November 1996:20, 10).  In addition, there was no statutory annual paid leave 
entitlement.  
 
While the Conservatives opposed the draft directive as well as the EU’s right to be 
involved in this area (instead of leaving the regulation of working time to employers 
and individual employees), Labour supported it. These preferences mirrored party 
stances on the regulation of the economy, rather than membership of the EU9. 
Consistent Tory support for the single market was a means to cement domestic neo-
liberal reforms. In contrast, the Labour Party seized on the opportunity and supported 
the Directive already since the submission of the Commission’s initial proposal in the 
summer of 1990. Under both Neil Kinnock and John Smith, Labour and the 
leadership of the trade union movement consistently supported regulated capitalism at 
the European level as a way of promoting ‘the creation of a high-productivity, high-
skill and high-wage economy in Britain and in the Community, instead of seeking to 
compete on the basis of low costs and low skills’ as John Smith put it (Hansard, 23 
June 1993:cols. 311-12).  
 
After managing to dilute the draft directive, the Tory British government 
unsuccessfully sought to have the Directive annulled by the European Court of Justice 
but lost (C-84/94 United Kingdom v. Council). The Labour Party remained committed 
to the Directive despite the policy reforms that followed Tony Blair’s election as party 
leader in 1994. These were meant to help shed the image of ‘old Labour’ in favour of 
decidedly business-friendly preferences, including emphasis on a flexible labour 
market.  
 
The Conservative government’s determination to undermine the operation of the 
Working Time Directive in Britain was evident in the consultation document it issued 
in December 1996. This effort was so resolute that in parts the intensions of the Tory 
government fell far short of the requirements of the Directive (Barnard, 1999) in line 
with the partisan hypothesis. The Conservative government sought to reduce 
significantly the scope of the application of the Directive through an excessively 
broad understanding of the excluded sectors. It also refused to offer a substantive 
interpretation of the Directive’s provisions that required it in a calculated attempt to 
limit its scope (DTI, 1996). Finally, it did not offer a mechanism for the establishment 
of ‘workforce agreements’ in workplaces where there was no recognised trade union. 
Despite the deadline of November 1996, the transposition of the directive had to wait 
until after New Labour’s landslide victory in 1997. 
 
The transposition of the Directive by the new government offered clear evidence in 
support of the partisan hypothesis in two ways.  First, it differed clearly from the 
intentions outlined in the Conservative government’s consultation document.  Second, 
it echoed the centrist moderation of the entire New Labour project. The New Labour 
government’s proposals - and ultimately the Working Time Regulations 1998 
whereby the Directive was transposed into the domestic legal order - differed from 
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those outlined by its Conservative predecessor in a number of important respects 
(Hall et al., 1998), including the following: Their scope is much wider and their 
provisions more generous to workers. The regulations apply not to ‘employees’ but to 
‘workers’ which is a broader category (Barnard, 1999), explicitly reject the 
mechanism of exclusion by association used by the Conservative government and opt 
for an expansive definition of night work thus bringing under the Directive’s 
protective shield a much wider group of night workers. They establish a shorter 
qualification period for paid annual leave and employ a more generous formula for 
the calculation of holiday pay than the method used even in the engineering industry 
where pay rates were not problematic.  “The government’s formula includes bonuses 
and allowances in the calculation of a week’s pay that most firms did not include in 
order to calculate and pay the holiday pay entitlement” as an official of a major 
employers’ organization put it (interview, London, 16 January 2009). In addition, the 
regulations establish a longer in-work rest break and a mechanism so that ‘workforce 
agreements’ can be reached where there is no recognised independent trade union 
while the notion of ‘workforce’ is defined in a manner that protects the outcome of 
collective agreements. Finally, they provide for a dual system of enforcement 
involving employment tribunals for cases regarding rest and leave entitlements and 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and local authorities in cases that concern 
mandatory limits and (when it comes to night workers) health assessments.  
 
Nevertheless, some similarities were also evident, the most important being the actual 
use of the individual opt-out, making  Britain the first and, for years, only member 
state to do so, in part as a result of ‘triangulation’. Thus, the government rejected calls 
from the unions to transpose the Directive in a minimalist, i.e. declaratory, manner (so 
as to give unions “flexibility in negotiations with difficult sectors or industries”), and 
phase out the opt-out (interview with former trade union leader, London, 21 
November 2008). Like its predecessor, the New Labour government used – though 
only until November 1999, in line with the Directive – the right to restrict to three 
weeks the statutory entitlement to paid annual leave.  
 
Evidence indicates that the New Labour government’s decisions reflect an enduring 
wish to make the Directive work in practice but the effect of its efforts has been 
mitigated by the determination to remain as faithful as possible to its business-
friendly profile - a cornerstone of the entire New Labour project. Involving formal 
institutions in implementation was seen, in the words of then Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s  words, as “the corollary of the protection of the individual opt-out”, i.e. an 
effort to ensure that individual choice would be exercised genuinely freely (interview, 
London, 27 March 2009). In reality, though, the pattern of implementation reflects the 
government’s (often implicit) preference for much ‘softer’ tools such as advice and 
conciliation through the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), the 
Vulnerable Worker Enforcement Forum, creating a helpline and showcasing 
examples of companies that successfully met the challenges posed by the long hours 
culture. After the transposition of the Directive in 1998, the HSE created a network of 
seven regional Working Time Officers (WTOs) who handle only non-risk-based 
cases. They offer advice and have the power to investigate complaints by visit but no 
power to take enforcement action. The initial number of WTOs reflected their 
expected workload and – more importantly – a key decision made directly by the 
government, in line with its broader preferences: it instructed the HSE (and, as a 
consequence, local authorities) to adopt a reactive approach to enforcement and not to 
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treat working time as a matter of high priority (Health and Safety Executive, 2000). 
This reduced the unscrupulous employers’ incentives to adapt to the new working 
time-related legislation.  
 
The opt-out is another key choice that has affected the pattern of implementation. The 
regulations have had marginal or no impact on the organisations that used it 
extensively (Neathey and Arrowsmith, 2001). Numerous firms have indicated that 
they have introduced changes with the aim of ‘working smarter’ – thereby leading to 
improved efficiency and improved customer satisfaction (Neathey and Arrowsmith, 
2001) but the impetus to do so would have been far greater in the absence of the opt-
out. Furthermore, the opt-out has weakened the employers’ incentive for reform 
through workforce agreements. It can be seen as an ‘insurance policy’ for employers, 
but there is evidence of abuse. Indeed, ‘many have signed it without realising it, as 
part of their employment documents’ or because they feel compelled to do so, e.g. 
when employers turn it into a condition of employment or when workers feel that 
their income will, or might, suffer if they do not sign it (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2003). Although the New Labour government supported its retention 
on grounds of ‘individual choice’, this choice is often exercised in ways that reflected 
the unequal distribution of power between employers and individual workers as well 
as lack of awareness on the part of employees and - as the CBI acknowledges, 
employers. Indeed, 68% of those who work long hours were aware of the legislation 
regarding working time limits but only 28% of them were able to cite the right weekly 
limit and no employees have signed the opt-out in approximately three quarters of the 
workplaces that are characterised by sustained long working hours (DTI, 2004). 
Despite the opt-out and the unions’ enduring weaknesses, unions and employers have 
been negotiating in the shadow of the law in an effort to reduce reliance on overtime.  
Several agreements have been reached that meet the unions’ objectives in terms of 
pay, working hours and productivity. Examples can be found in sectors as diverse as 
the food industry, financial services and energy (interview with TUC official, 
London, 27 November 2008) and the printing industry.  
 
Following the change of leader in 2005, the Tories singled out the Directive as an 
example of policy areas that a future Conservative government would seek to bring 
back under national control (The Times, 9 November 2009: 5), unlike the New Labour 
government that supported the status quo both at the European and the national level. 
After the general election of May 2010 the coalition government of the Tories and the 
Liberal Democrats vowed to ‘work to limit the application of the Working Time 
Directive in the United Kingdom’ (HM Government, 2010). 
 
France: From the moderate Left to the neo-liberal Right 
The regulation of working time has been a major political issue for decades in France. 
In substantive terms, the French policy tradition entails the gradual reduction of 
working time. This broad trend does not obscure differences between the Left and the 
Right. While the Left often promoted the reduction of working time as (i) an 
expression of its projet de société and (ii) a means to create jobs, the reductions 
introduced by the Right were often defensive, i.e. they were aimed at job protection. 
The French Left and Right have operated within a culture of collective bargaining, but 
the Left has used legislation extensively so as to set higher standards. This is so 
because for the French Left the relationship between employers and employees is 
unbalanced. As a result, the Left was much more willing than the Right to intervene. 
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The Right has been much more willing than the Left to (i) finance working time 
reductions from the public purse and (ii) focus on the organization of working time 
(i.e. choices regarding its use such as flexibility clauses etc). In contrast, the Left has 
been much more concerned with the duration of working time (since this is a key 
determinant of productivity, availability of labour and employment levels) and it 
considers part-time work as temps subi. Nevertheless, as regards the organization of 
working time, these are differences of degree.  
 
Despite limited legal differences10, there was no major conflict between the French 
arrangements and the Directive. “Il n’y avait pas de conflit majeur sur le fond entre la 
sirective sur le temps de travail et la legislation nationale française” as a former senior 
official of the Ministry of Labour put it (interview, Paris, 7 May 2009; also interview 
with French ministerial adviser, Paris, 15 June 2009). This is due to the combined 
effect of domestic provisions and collective agreements. In addition, France was not 
thought to be associated with excessive working hours in part due to the presence 
(since the second half of the 19th century) of the Inspecteurs du travail who are 
responsible for the implementation of employment legislation on a day-to-day basis.  
 
Although the Directive had been proposed and negotiated while the Socialists were in 
power in France, it was formally adopted eights months after the Centre-Right’s 
return to power following the elections of March 1993. Unlike the Conservative 
British government, the new French government of the Centre-Right did not oppose 
the Directive, nor did it transpose it during the three-year transition that ended in 
November 1996, despite having a robust majority in Parliament and passing a major 
law (loi Robien) in the same policy area during this period.  
 
The radical (but gradual) reduction of statutory working time from 39 to 35 hours 
without salary reduction featured prominently in the Socialists’ election manifesto 
ahead of the 1997 election that led to the victory of Gauche plurielle. Combating 
working time abuses and the use of overtime was, in addition to the fight against 
unemployment – the explicit aim of this reform. The government of the Left took 
action that involved both domestic policy change and the transposition of the 
Directive through the enactment of the Aubry laws, despite ferocious opposition from 
the major employers’ national associations and their political allies. The first Aubry 
law (Loi n° 98-461) dealt with the outstanding issues of the 11-hour daily rest and rest 
breaks and set out the basic parameters of the major policy reform, leaving room for 
negotiations between the social partners on practical details. In that sense, the 
government of the Left restored the pre-eminence of the legislative route and 
encouraged negotiations between the social partners. These two methods were 
combined because of the weakness of the French trade unions.  
 
The full transposition of the Directive entailed the introduction of a new definition of 
working time, the modification of the Code du travail by a series of decrees covering 
rest periods in specific sectors (such as agriculture, the civil service etc.), the adoption 
of the second Aubry law that resolved the problem of the 24-hour weekly rest period 
and a law (Loi n° 2001-397) that dealt with issues regarding night work. The first 
Aubry law reduced statutory working time to 35 hours per week. This would apply 
from January 2000 to firms employing 20 persons or more and two years later for the 
rest; it also encouraged firms to negotiate with their employees the more rapid 
reduction of working time. The provision of financial aid was conditional on job 
Forthcoming, 2016. Accepted for publication in Comparative European Politics.  
 
10/19 
creation and the commitment to maintain these jobs for at least two years. The second 
Aubry law built on the agreements that had been concluded in the meantime, 
guaranteed for five years the income of workers on the minimum wage, significantly 
reduced the conditions for the provision of financial incentives to firms and did not 
make particular demands on firms with regards to the calculation of the time actually 
worked.  
 
The transposition of the Working Time Directive contributed to the re-balancing of 
the relationship between the social partners. Between them, the Directive and 
domestic French legislation defined boundaries that curtailed the employers’ 
autonomy whilst strengthening the employees’ (collective) bargaining position. This 
contrasts markedly with the reforms introduced by the Right after its return to power 
in 2002. In an affort to boost job creation, the Jospin government significantly 
reduced the hitherto strong incentives incentives for overtime, i.e. the time actually 
worked over and above 35 hours.  
 
In addition, the option of utilising the individual opt-out – the most controversial 
aspect of the Directive - was rejected by the government of the Left because the 
corresponding clause of the Directive was seen as a temporary measure and, above 
all, its utilization was construed as unacceptable in the French context.  “L’utilisation 
de la clause opt-out était impénsable politiquement” as a French ministerial adviser 
put it (interview, Paris, 15 June 2009). Finally, the Aubry laws dealt with the thorny 
issue of the working time of cadres. Until the late 1990s, their working time was 
covered by the general arrangements regarding other employees but French courts had 
acknowledged the exception of those whose pay is independent of their working time, 
i.e. usually senior executives whose tasks involve a significant degree of autonomy 
(Askenazy et al., 2004). The second Aubry law formalized this arrangement 
specifically for this narrow category of executives.  
 
Evidence also indicates that the orientation of the parties in power directly affects the 
pattern of implementation even in a country where the Directive per se was not 
controversial. In other words, who is in power matters, in line with the partisan 
hypothesis. As will be demonstrated below, decisions made by the government of the 
day in pursuit of domestically-defined policy priorities have affected the 
implementation of the Directive.   
 
The implementation of the Aubry laws led to the creation of a significant number of 
jobs but it also promoted flexibility and the diversification of the workforce even 
within the same firm and, finally, it affected the quality of working conditions. The 
combination of reduced working time and increased flexibility deployed by the 
government of the Left was compatible with the Directive. During this process the 
active French framework remained above the level stipulated by the Directive, 
whereas the post-2002 drive towards liberalisation introduced by the Right 
transformed the Directive into a safety net for employees.  
 
Flexibility took two forms, namely ‘modulation’ (i.e. matching the cycles of working 
time to the fluctuations of workload) and further recourse to the calculation of 
working time on an annual basis (‘annualization’). Workers and their representatives 
accepted the combined recourse to these forms of flexibility only after the 
government had turned them into parts of a broader and transparent trade-off that also 
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involved reduced working time as well as job creation. However, increased flexibility 
also generated problems, including the non-payment of overtime – “il y a le problème 
d’heures suppémentaires travaillées mais non-payés” – in some sectors due to the 
extension of the reference period to a year (interviews with labour inspectors, Paris, 
15 and 16 June 2009), thus enhancing (at least initially) the appeal of the Right’s 
response to the Aubry laws, especially in the run-up to the 2007 presidential election 
which the Right’s candidate (Nicolas Sarkozy) fought on the basis of the slogan 
‘travailler plus pour gagner plus’ (work more to earn more). 
 
The Right’s extension of the forfait en jours to wider groups of employees after 2002 
corresponds to the determination to undermine the Jospin government’s reforms and 
turn the regulation of working time into a core aspect of competition between firms – 
a key trait of neoliberalism. Whereas in the past the differences between the two main 
political families allowed the domestic regulation of working time to remain clearly 
above the standards stipulated by the Working Time Directive, the post-2002 reforms 
introduced by the Right effectively turned EU legislation into a safety net for French 
employees. The Right’s pursuit of liberalization pushed standards down, i.e. much 
closer to (or, at times, even below) the level stipulated by the Directive. These 
reforms focus on three core elements of the Aubry laws, namely the duration and cost 
of overtime and – more importantly – flexibility. Whilst not explicitly abolishing the 
35-hour week, these changes have transformed it beyond recognition in a manner that 
directly corresponds to the wishes of the patronat.  
 
More specifically, the loi Fillon dramatically increased the overtime quota, 
significantly reduced the cost of overtime and generalized the system of forfait en 
jours that had hitherto been limited to executives. After Sarkozy’s victory in 2007, the 
loi TEPA encouraged recourse to overtime by abolishing taxes on earnings from it and 
reducing the corresponding social security charges both for employers and employees 
in an effort to stimulate demand by increasing purchasing power. The other central 
aspect of the reforms introduced after 2002 concerns the hierarchy of norms in the 
area of employment legislation and the extension of the scope for derogations (Loi n° 
2004-391) and the significant enhancement of the power of employers. Finally, the 
role of street-level implementers has become a great deal more difficult because an 
already complicated set of arrangements has been rendered even more complex.  
 
The employers’ increased autonomy has been associated with problems regarding the 
flexible use of the workforce in particular in sectors marked by low-skilled and often 
precarious jobs and low levels of unionisation such as logistics, retail, cleaning, 
security (interviews with labour inspectors, Paris, 18 June and 7 July 2009, Île de 
France, 7 July 2009, Lyon, 10 July 2009). Although the second Aubry law stipulated 
that changes could be made to an employee’s work schedule only after a week’s 
notice had been served, meeting this délai de prévenance has remained problematic – 
despite the fact that the same principle was reiterated in 2008 - as frequent and sudden 
changes are made to work schedules and employees (or their representatives) are not 
always consulted (interviews with labour inspectors, Paris, 6 and 8 July 2009, Lyon, 
10 July 2009). The occurrence of these problems in the aforementioned sectors is 
linked to a large extent to the precarious nature of these jobs and the fact that low-
skilled employees can be easily replaced. More importantly, the reversal of the 
hierarchy of norms has had a profound effect on the ‘ground’11. The task of labour 
inspectors has become much harder because facts have to be compared to a much 
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more complicated and highly individualized set of arrangements - especially those 
that have been created at the level of firms. This renders controls much more time-
consuming, uncertain and cumbersome.  
 
 
PARTY FAMILY OR NATION STATE? 
 
The preceding analysis reveals differences both between party families (in line with 
cleavage theory) and within them. First, each within-country comparison confirms the 
partisan hypothesis derived from cleavage theory. Both cases reveal that parties of the 
Right sought to maximise the autonomy of employers, while parties of the Left sought 
– to varying extent – to channel it. In other words, not only do ‘[p]olitical cleavages 
give rise to ideological commitments or “prisms” through which political parties 
respond to new issues, including European integration’ (Marks et al., 2002:585) thus 
shaping party preferences, but the influence of the same prisms extends to the 
implementation of EU public policy.  
 
Second, the cross-country comparison reveals a more complex (and, in the case of the 
Right, dynamic) picture: the range of options that is available to ruling parties is 
country-specific. The national context affects the scope of the validity of the partisan 
hypothesis though differences are more significant within the Left than they are 
amongst conservative parties in Britain and France. Among conservative parties, 
although the rhetoric is much tougher in Britain than it is in France, there is growing 
similarity between the substance of their views not on the issue of the competence of 
the EU but in regards to the role of the state. After its return to power in 2002 the 
French Right moved clearly and decisively in the direction of deregulation by means 
of successive legislative reforms that dismantle the acquis of the Left. In doing so it 
followed the British Conservatives. Both parties firmly (and when in power actively) 
support the autonomy of employers and flexibility in the labour market and now share 
the willingness to turn working time into a key element of regime competition. This is 
why both parties now accept the logic of the opt-out. On the other hand, although the 
PS and New Labour agree on the fundamental issue of the EU’s involvement in this 
area of policy, when in government the latter was timid in comparison to the former. 
Eager to maintain and further promote flexibility in the labour market, the New 
Labour government made full use of the opt-out and ‘soft’ tools in the implementation 
phase unlike the PS which remained faithful in the deployment of a much wider range 
of tools. So, what accounts for this cross-national picture? 
 
Cleavage theory helps shed light on the dynamics within the right of the political 
spectrum. The UMP does not share the Tories’ scepticism towards the involvement of 
the EU in the regulation of working time but it has certainly come to share their 
deregulation agenda. In line with cleavage theory (Marks and Wilson, 2000), the 
UMP’s gradual turn from Gaullism to a clear neo-liberal stance was already evident 
since the 1980s in its forerunner (RPR) (Baudouin, 1990) and even more so after the 
election of Nicolas Sarkozy as party leader in November 2004 against his 
souverainiste main rival, and the ascendancy of economic liberals - such as François 
Fillon (who served both as employment minister and prime minister in post-2002 
governments of the Right) and Jean-François Copé (budget minister and later on 
leader of UMP’s parliamentary group in the National Assembly) - reflect a change in 
the balance of power between the two ideological strands (free marketeers and the 
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nationalist strand) that permeate the main French conservative party (as it does 
elsewhere in Europe). The neo-liberal wing of the party has spearheaded the attack on 
the 35-hour working week in addition to promoting tax cuts for higher revenues 
(Haegel, 2007). The most telling piece of evidence is the transformation of the 
regulation of working time into an aspect of competition between firms and, by 
extension, between governments that seek to attract capital which is a key component 
of ‘the European project of neo-liberalism’. This marked a clear break with the 
French Right’s past. In addition, since France has been ruled largely by governments 
of the Right or the Centre-Right since the end of World War II, they have been 
associated with the development of the role of labour inspectors but the evolution of 
their role after the Right’s return to power in 2002 and, in particular, 2007 is another 
indication of the increasing strength of neo-liberal strand. By the same token, the rise 
of neo-liberalism within the British Conservative Party in the 1980s has weakened 
‘one-nation Tories’ and has led to a break with the previous paradigm (collective 
laissez-faire) and the collective agreements that it entailed. The common thread that 
links these developments is the determination to promote the autonomy of employers 
and the individualisation of the workforce in the relentless pursuit of a neo-liberal 
conception of competitiveness.  
 
Cleavage theory cannot explain the differences between the PS and New Labour in 
the case examined here.  New Labour adopted a much more laissez faire stance than 
the PS did on the key issues of (a) the individual opt-out and flexibility more 
generally and (b) the use of a standard or a light-touch style of enforcement.  New 
Labour chose to respond largely in the terms of the Right’s acquis and its own 
commitments to business organisations.  In addition, the equilibrium point chosen by 
New Labour could be defended vis-à-vis competing interests, namely the unions 
(since it was better than the status quo ante and what the Tories were willing to do), 
businesses organisations (since Britain had to comply with the Directive and the 
problem of excessively long hours was widely recognised) and low-paid individual 
workers who needed the extra income generated by overtime and thus were sceptical 
of the weekly working time limit in the context of the UK’s residual welfare state. In 
addition, while New Labour could always highlight the progress made because of the 
Working Time Directive, the PS did not have this option (until the alternance of 
2002) because the level of protection offered by domestic arrangements was higher 
than that offered by the Directive.   
 
Patterns of interest organisation and party-union links appear to be inversely 
correlated with the action taken by the PS-led and New Labour governments. 
Membership levels12 and organizational coherence are much lower in France and 
party-union links are much closer in the UK where the unions are Labour’s main 
financial supporters. Yet, the PS saw the low level of union membership as a reason 
for legislative intervention in this area of policy whereas for New Labour the pattern 
of declining (though much higher than in France) union membership in Britain was a 
factor that weakened the position of trade union leaders, especially in terms of the 
individual opt-out which remains an emblematic difference between the two parties. 
As regards density and centralization of membership in employers’ organisations, 
these are higher in France than in the UK. Yet, it was the New Labour government 
that made formal use of the opt-out and soft tools as part of its ‘business friendly’ 
stance, while the Jospin-led government introduced the 35-hour working week which 
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the CNPF/MEDEF vehemently opposed. MEDEF has supported the neo-liberal 
reforms introduced, since 2002, by the French governments of the Right.  
 
The political salience of membership of the EU cannot explain cross-national 
differences within political families. The gradual dismantling of the 35-hour working 
week – done in a way that also affected the implementation of the directive – in 
France coincided with the deeply polarized debate on the ratification of the EU’s 
constitutional treaty and the adoption of the controversial ‘Bolkestein’ (services) 
directive. If salience mattered, the French governments of the Right would not have 
adopted the deregulatory measures described above. The French Right also opposed 
the reforms introduced by the Jospin governments when European integration was not 
an active political issue in France. In Britain the Conservatives remained opposed to 
the directive throughout the period examined here, i.e. both when the issue of 
Britain’s membership of the EU was active and when it was not. Labour supported the 
Directive and opposed the UK’s opt-out from the ‘social chapter’ when a clear 
majority of British citizens opposed EU-level decision making on health and safety 





The impact of party government on domestic patterns of EU policy implementation 
has been contested, extant literature that deals with this issue is overwhelmingly 
focused on the analysis of transposition and does not problematise the origin of party 
preferences. In relation to that literature, two broad claims are advanced on the basis 
of the two sets of comparisons presented in this article, both of which reflect the 
acknowledged (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006) need to go beyond the static notion 
of the ‘goodness of fit’. First, each of the two within-country comparisons shows that 
parties matter not only in transposition - contra Linos (2007: 563) but more in line 
with Falkner et al. (2005: 322-3) - but also in the more complex post-transposition 
phase. This conclusion is in line with a growing body of literature that demonstrates 
that the internationalisation of policy making is not necessarily antithetical to party 
government (see, e.g. Jensen and Spoon, 2011, Zahariadis, 2010, Milner and Judkins, 
2004, Rathbun, 2004) and also shows that the distinction between enforcement and 
management perspectives found in international relations literature can be 
exaggerated.  This is so because the calculus on which the former relies is not fixed 
and the capabilities that the latter highlights are at least partly the result of domestic 
decisions reflecting ideological sensitivities. Moreover, unlike existing literature 
which had not problematised the origin of party preferences, this article shows the 
relevance of cleavage theory since (a) its core hypothesis has been confirmed and (b) 
provides a powerful theoretical underpinning as to the origin of these preferences. 
Second, the cross-national comparison reveals a more complex picture, demonstrating 
that there are more than one ways to ‘comply’ in the context of party government. 
While membership of a political family indicates the direction of the preferences of 
individual parties, the range of options that is deemed to be available to them (when 
in government) and the chosen equilibrium point are country-specific, mainly on the 
Left. On the right of the political spectrum, cleavage theory is useful also because it 
highlights the implications of the balance of power between the two strands that 
permeate conservative parties. 
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In other words, evidence indicates that the national context (the status quo ante, 
patterns of interest organisation and party-union links but not the salience of EU 
membership) in which ruling parties implement EU public policy affects the scope of 
the validity of the partisan hypothesis. In that sense, the autonomy of the nation state 
in the context of the implementation of EU policy in the socio-economic domain is 
not as restricted as it had hitherto been thought – rather, it is channeled - and far from 
ending domestic political contestation on the Left-Right axis, European integration 
and its concrete domestic manifestations remain subject to it. This conclusion is 
drawn from the study of two examples of the Westminster model and one type of 
policy. However, since (a) new governments cannot be expected to change everything 
and (b) policy-specific (as opposed to the more generic issue of EU membership) 
issue salience is likely to vary, comparisons across categories of public policy offer a 
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1 This process involves (a) the transposition of these rules into national statute books and (b) the 
subsequent action taken by national authorities aiming to give concrete meaning to the transposed 
rules. Compliance is a state of affairs and only one of a range of possible results of the 
implementation process.  
2 However, see (Jensen, 2007) on infringement proceedings and (Schmidt, 2014) on reactions to ECJ 
rulings.   
3 Implementation research is a painstaking process requiring significant resources, which is why the 
authors of an extensive study of transposition covering 15 member states and several EU social policy 
directives acknowledged they ‘could not conduct an in-depth study of application and enforcement’ 
(Falkner et al., 2005: 327). 
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4 While Linos argues that the government’s position on the left–right scale does not ‘seem to be of 
import’ (2007: 563), Falkner et al. identify a ‘world of domestic politics’ where ‘fit’ with the 
government’s preferences facilitates transposition (2005: 322-3). 
5 Council Directive 93/104/EC of 23 November 1993 concerning certain aspects of the organization of 
working time,  Official Journal of the European Communities, L 307, 13 December 1993.   
6 On the broader usefulness of ‘small-N’ studies see (Rueschemeyer, 2003).  
7 The Working Time Directive was one of several employment-related directives that the UK had 
opposed in the early 1990s but at the same time it had a very good implementation record throughout 
the 1990s (Börzel, 2001: tables 2 and 3) and had also managed to secure concessions in the context of 
negotiations in the Council of Ministers (Falkner et al., 2005b: 75-7, 122-3, 143-4).  In addition, 
given how successful the Conservatives had been in presenting themselves domestically as the 
economically competent party, departing from their view was a risky route for Labour and in the 
specific case of working time one that may not have yielded political benefits since ‘it was not a big 
demonstration, anger on the streets kind of issue’ as a British former leading trade unionist put it 
(interview, 19 January 2009).  So, from the UK perspective this is not a ‘most likely case’ in relation 
to the research question discussed in this article.   
8 These were politicians (including members of parliament, a former prime minister of France, a 
British employment secretary and a shadow employment secretary), ministerial (and two prime 
ministerial) advisers, civil servants (a total of eight serving and former central government officials) 
and officials of parties, trade unions (including four former leaders of trade unions in France and the 
UK) and business organisations.  These included 20 interviews with labour inspectors operating at 
central, regional and local levels in France (9) and health and safety as well as local government 
officials operating at the local and regional levels in the UK (11) with (i) a geographical coverage that 
included the two capitals and at least two regional centres of significant economic activity and (ii) 
levels of seniority that includes one junior, five mid-ranking and five senior officials in the UK, and 
two senior and seven junior officials in France.   
9 It remained in place both when the employment portfolio was held by a Eurosceptic (Michael 
Howard) and a pro-European (David Hunt) Tory minister. 
10 These differences concerned a ban on night work for women, the absence of a statutory limit 
regarding daily rest and an eleven-hour difference in terms of weekly rest. 
11 The proportion of firm-level agreements that dealt with working time has increased by more than 10 
per cent between 2007 and 2008 unlike the trend observed in previous years (Liaisons sociales, 10 
June 2009, 1).  
12 According to the OECD trade union density dropped from 18.3 per cent to 7.8 per cent and from 
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